

TRADE-OFFS BETWEEN CIVIL LIBERTIES AND NATIONAL SECURITY: A DISCRETE CHOICE EXPERIMENT

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We explore differences in perception of national security policies between self-identified liberals, moderates, and conservatives from a national sample of U.S. adults. Using a discrete choice experiment, we also quantify each group's willingness to trade off select policies in exchange for reduced risk of a 9/11-style terrorist attack. Relative to other groups, liberals are more likely to view such policies as ineffective and susceptible to government abuse. They also perceive a lower threat of terrorism. All groups are willing to make trade-offs between civil liberties and risk of a terrorist attack. However, loss of civil liberties affects liberals more than conservatives. (JEL D61, H41, H56)

I. INTRODUCTION

The September 11th, 2001, terrorist attacks shocked the nation and the world, inflicting emotional and financial costs that would be impossible to fully enumerate. In an effort to prevent future attacks, in October 2001, President George W. Bush signed the USA Patriot Act into law. At that time, both liberals and conservatives overwhelmingly supported this law (it passed the Senate 98 to 1) which made it easier for government agencies to clandestinely gather intelligence, monitor and regulate financial transactions, and broadened the discretion of law enforcement and immigration authorities to detain, perhaps indefinitely, and/or deport immigrants suspected of terrorism-related acts, among other provisions. Major provisions of the law have been

extended since 2001, once in 2005 by President Bush and again in 2011 by President Obama in the National Defense Authorization Act. This is despite growing concern that several aspects of the Act severely impinge upon civil liberties (Coghlan 2011; Kain 2011; Ramasastry 2005).

Beyond the Patriot Act, in 2003 then Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld approved the use of “enhanced interrogation techniques,” including water boarding, where water is poured over the head of a captive to simulate the sensation of drowning (Greenberg, Rosenberg, and de Vouge 2008). These techniques became the subject of much public debate in the late 2000s. This debate subsided in 2009 when President Obama issued an executive order barring the CIA from using water boarding or similar interrogation techniques (Isikoff 2009).

Other policies, such as enhanced screening at airports, are seen both as an invasion of privacy and an inconvenience, and, not surprisingly, public support is mixed for these as well (Cohen and Halsey 2010). The June 2013 leak surrounding the National Security Agency's secret surveillance programs, which involved tracking citizens' phone calls and internet activity, reinvigorated public debate concerning how much leeway the government should have in its fight

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ABBREVIATIONS

DCE: Discrete Choice Experiment
DHS: Department of Homeland Security
KN: Knowledge Networks
RUM: Random Utility Model

against terrorism. When it comes to these programs, reaction again is mixed; a Pew Research Center (2013) poll fielded within a month after the leak found that 51% of Americans view the programs as unacceptable. Putting legal issues aside, what these examples reveal is that, in an effort to reduce the risk of terrorist attacks, policymakers are faced with the delicate task of increasing the security of the nation without overly impinging on civil liberties or imposing an undue burden on the public.

Viscusi and Zeckhauser (2003) present a theoretical model depicting trade-offs between civil liberties and security. They present a series of indifference curves with varying levels of utility where individuals are indifferent between given bundles of civil liberties and security. They further assume that individuals have a perceived frontier (similar to a production possibilities frontier) that traces out the maximum perceived level of security associated with any given level of civil liberties. Optimality occurs at the tangency point: when individuals reach the highest possible indifference curve that does not extend beyond the perceived frontier.

Consistent with this model, a number of published studies have shown that Americans recognize and are willing to accept trade-offs between civil liberties and terrorism risk reduction (Davis and Silver 2004; Garcia and Geva 2014; Mondak and Hurwitz 2012). Other studies show that individuals are willing to accept other types of inconveniences, such as longer waiting times at airports (Smith, Mansfield, and Clayton 2009; Viscusi and Zeckhauser 2003), and are willing to pay higher taxes (Smith, Mansfield, and Clayton 2009) to reduce terrorism risk. However, these studies do not quantify the reduction in civil liberties and/or personal freedoms that individuals would be willing to accept in exchange for reduced risk of a terrorist attack nor do they explore results separately by political ideology.

Whereas the theoretical model suggests that all individuals are willing to make trade-offs between civil liberties and security, the optimal level of each varies by political ideology. For example, if liberals, on average, place a greater emphasis on civil liberties than do conservatives, then for a liberal to be indifferent to a reduction in civil liberties, they must be compensated with greater improvements in security than what a conservative would require. Second, if liberals perceive a greater likelihood that the government would abuse security policies, they would again

require more effective policies before they would willingly accept them. Finally, if liberals view the likelihood of future attacks as lower, this would alter their perceived trade-off curve and optimality would occur at a greater level of civil liberties.

Using data from a national survey of U.S. adults, we explore beliefs about homeland security policies and quantify the extent to which individuals are willing to trade off civil liberties in exchange for increased security. We then test whether the estimates vary by political affiliation. Specifically, we hypothesize that liberals, compared to moderates and then conservatives (1) believe the threat of a terrorist attack to be lower, (2) believe that national security policies are more likely to be abused by government officials, and (3) believe that such policies are less likely to be effective. With regards to policy preferences, we hypothesize that, *ceteris paribus*, liberals place more weight on protecting civil liberties than do moderates or conservatives and thus would be willing to accept greater risk of terrorist attacks. We test this hypothesis using data collected from a stated-preference discrete choice experiment (DCE) survey that quantifies individuals' willingness to trade off select features of homeland security policies in exchange for risk of a 9/11 style terrorist attack. The non-market nature of terrorism risk and homeland security policies makes DCE an effective tool to quantify differences in strength of preferences. Given the abstract nature of the policies, we do not view the specific dollar amounts calculated as precise estimates of willingness to pay, but rather as a way to quantify trade-offs across multiple attributes and provide insights into the public's preferences about homeland security policies. In addition to exploring the factors driving differences in preferences between political groups, we also investigate the welfare consequences of adopting different homeland security policies.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes the survey design and methods for analysis. Section III presents select survey results, including results of the DCE analyses. Section IV concludes with a discussion of policy implications.

II. METHODS

A. Data Collection

To measure the risk and welfare trade-offs with select homeland security policies, we conducted a web-based survey administered to the

online Knowledge Networks (KN) panel in November and December 2010.¹ Our sample consisted of individuals who are over the age of 18 and reside within the United States.

The survey consisted of five sections. The first section included questions on security-related behaviors. Respondents were asked about their perceptions of airline travel and their travel habits, as this is the context in which most U.S. citizens are directly affected by counterterrorism policies. Questions on library, internet, and telephone use were also included as were perceptions about past terrorist events.

The second and third sections focused on introducing respondents to five counterterrorism policy levers: government access to personal information; racial or ethnic profiling; confinement of suspected terrorists; harsh methods of interrogation; and increasing taxes to fund counterterrorism efforts.

Respondents were given a short description of each of the five policy options (Table A1) and made familiar with the range of levels of these options to be used in the DCE section of the survey. A further set of questions about these options yielded data on the perceived effectiveness of these policies, the potential for abuse, and the level of support. Questions on terrorism outcomes, including an estimate of the number of deaths in the United States from terrorism over the next 10 years were also included.

The final section of the survey, after the DCE questions, collected information about opinions and personal characteristics, including demographics and political leanings (liberal, moderate, or conservative). To ascertain political leaning, the survey contained a question from the American National Election Survey: "When it comes to politics, do you usually think of yourself as: extremely liberal; liberal; slightly liberal; moderate or middle of the road; slightly conservative; conservative; or extremely conservative?" We combined the first and last three categories to represent liberals and conservatives,

respectively, and left moderates to include those respondents who selected the middle category.

The fourth section of the survey was the DCE section. DCE is a type of stated-preference survey (Hensher, Rose, and Greene 2005). Goods, services, or policies are defined by a set of attributes. Respondents evaluate a series of tasks that require them to choose amongst these goods, services, or policies and their choices reveal the rate at which they are willing to trade off attributes and attribute levels against each other. DCE has been widely used in consumer product marketing and also to evaluate health, environmental, and transportation programs and policies. In recent years, this method has been used to evaluate the social welfare implications of government homeland security policies (Smith, Mansfield, and Clayton 2009). The nonmarket nature of many of the costs and benefits associated with homeland security policies makes stated-preference surveys one of the few appropriate methods to evaluate public preferences (Kanninen 2007).

Attributes and levels for the policy options were determined by consulting the literature, through a series of one-on-one interviews, and through feedback from social scientists at the Human Factors Division (now called the Resilient Systems Division) of the Department of Homeland Security.² Levels were further refined via analysis of results from two pilot studies. All attributes and levels are given in Table 1. The National Security Outcome is defined as "the chance that a major terrorist attack occurs on U.S. soil that kills 3,000 individuals over the next 10 years." For each policy option considered, respondents were told to assume that the outcomes were accurate predictions made by a panel of experts.

Prior to beginning the DCE questions, respondents were shown text that encouraged them to answer the DCE questions assuming these were real choices. The purpose of this text, referred to as "cheap talk" was to mitigate the problem of hypothetical bias that can occur in stated-preference surveys (Özdemir, Johnson, and Hauber 2009). Respondents were also told to assume that there were no legal barriers to implementing the policy choices and to assume that only tax increases could be used to pay for these policies. Table 2 provides the full set of text presented to participants prior to the start of the DCE section.

2. The final choices for the survey questions were made by the authors and do not reflect the opinions of the Department of Homeland Security.

1. KN (now GfK) maintains a web-based panel of U.S. households that were originally recruited through random-digit dialing; more recently KN has begun using address-based sampling to recruit the panel (for more information on KN, see <http://www.knowledgenetworks.com>). If the household does not have a computer, KN provides the household with a computer and internet access. If the household does have a computer, KN pays for internet access. In return, the households agree to take a specific number of surveys. KN controls the number of survey invitations panel members receive. Samples for specific surveys are drawn from the panel using probability methods.

TABLE 1
Attributes and Levels

Attributes	Levels
Increasing your taxes to fund efforts to prevent terrorism	\$500 over the next 10 years or \$50 per year on average \$1,500 over the next 10 years or \$150 per year on average \$3,000 over the next 10 years or \$300 per year on average \$7,000 over the next 10 years or \$700 per year on average
Government access to personal information	Never allowed Allowed but only with a judge’s permission Allowed if suspected of terrorist activity but without a judge’s permission Always allowed
Using race, ethnicity, or country of citizenship to identify potential terrorists	Never allowed Allowed based on country of citizenship only Always allowed
Jailing suspected terrorists without trial	Less than 6 months 6 months to 2 years 2–7 years Indefinite (no limit)
Using harsh methods to question suspected terrorists	Never allowed in any case Allowed, but only after approval from a responsible official (like a judge) and to prevent a possible imminent attack Allowed, but only after approval from a responsible official (like a judge) regardless of whether an attack is imminent Allowed whenever the questioner thinks it might be effective in gathering information that will help in the fight against terrorism
National security outcomes	0.0% chance of an attack will occur 0.1% chance of an attack that will kill 3000 people 1.0% chance of an attack that will kill 3000 people 5.0% chance of an attack that will kill 3000 people 7.0% chance of an attack that will kill 3000 people

TABLE 2
Introductory Text for Stated-Preference Questions

In the next set of questions, imagine that the U.S. government is proposing different policy options for combating terrorism and you are being asked to choose between each option. These options are created from a mix of the different security strategies we have asked you to think about earlier in the survey. Below each policy option, we list the expected probability that a terrorist attack will kill 3,000 individuals on U.S. soil if the option is chosen.



Please respond to each of these questions. We understand that choosing between each policy option may not be easy, but your results will be of value in determining how U.S. residents respond to various trade-offs related to homeland security. Consider each choice carefully and as though they are real choices. Think carefully about the benefits and costs of each option. How would you feel if the policy option you chose were implemented by the government? Assume all the strategies we ask you to consider are legal. It is possible that some options will contain strategies that are not allowed under current U.S. law. For the purpose of this survey, please ignore this fact and assume all strategies are legal when selecting which option you prefer. Assume only tax increases can be used to pay for the policies. We understand that many respondents might prefer that other government programs be cut in order to pay for these policies. However, for the purposes of this survey we are interested in your willingness to pay for increased security with your own tax dollars. So, for simplicity, please assume that these tax increases are necessary to pay for the policies.

The DCE section required respondents to choose between two hypothetical homeland security policies with varying levels of the key policy options and the outcome variable. A sample task for the survey is presented in Figure 1. The experimental design was generated by Sawtooth Choice Based Conjoint software, which uses an iterative algorithm to produce a design that is statistically efficient, minimizes level overlap, and ensures level balance (Zwerina,

Huber, and Kuhfeld 1996). The design for the survey produced 25 versions of four choice tasks. Respondents were randomly assigned to one of these versions.

In addition to the four choice tasks from the experimental design, each respondent was given three more choice tasks which were the same for all respondents to ensure data quality and check the reliability of the data. First, a warm-up choice task was included where only two

FIGURE 1
Example Conjoint Task

	Option A	Option B
Government Policy Options to Improve Security		
Increase in your taxes to fund efforts to prevent terrorism over the next 10 years	\$500 over the next 10 years [\$50 per year on average]	\$3,000 over the next 10 years [\$300 per year on average]
Government access to personal information	Allowed but only with a judge's permission	Allowed but only with a judge's permission
Using race, ethnicity, or country of citizenship to identify potential terrorists	Not allowed	Not allowed
Jailing suspected terrorists without trial	Less than 6 months	Less than 6 months
Using harsh methods to question suspected terrorists	Allowed, but only with approval from responsible official to prevent imminent attack	Allowed, but only with approval from responsible official to prevent imminent attack
National Security Outcomes		
Chance that 3,000 deaths from terrorism will occur on U.S. soil over the next 10 years.	Chances are 70 out of 1,000 [7%] 	Chances are 10 out of 1,000 [1%] 
If these were your only two options, which would you choose?	—	—

attributes were allowed to differ—taxes and terrorism risk (Figure A1). Data collected from this question were excluded from the analysis below but this simplified choice task served as a practice question so that quality of responses to subsequent questions would be improved. Second, a choice task was included where one option was clearly better than the other to test whether respondents were paying careful attention to the choice tasks (Figure A2). Specifically, Option B had lower taxes and lower risk of terrorist attack than Option A. The levels of the other attributes were the same between the two options as preferences differ for these attributes. Lastly, a

holdout task was included to test the predictive validity of our data analysis. The attribute levels of this task were so that they overlapped well with the levels presented in the other choice tasks and so that neither option dominated the other (Figure A3).

The holdout task was used to test the out-of-sample prediction performance of the econometric model. Specifically, the model was estimated using only the answers to the four choice tasks generated from an experimental design. The results of the model were then used to predict how respondents would answer the hold-out choice task. These predictions were then

FIGURE 2
Example Questions—Harsh Methods

<p>1. How effective do you believe using harsh and painful methods to question a suspected terrorist is for gaining information and reducing terrorist threats?</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Very effective</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Somewhat effective</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Somewhat ineffective</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Very ineffective</p> <p>2. How likely do you think it is that if U.S. government officials were allowed to use harsh and painful methods when questioning suspected terrorists, this policy would be abused by government officials?</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Very likely</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Somewhat likely</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Somewhat unlikely</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Very unlikely</p>

compared to the actual choices of respondents to evaluate how well the model performs. If the model accurately predicts respondent's choices, this lends additional credibility to the results.

B. Data Analysis

In the theoretical model discussed in Section II, an individual's policy choices depend on their perceived risk of terrorism for any given level of civil liberties, perceived effectiveness of counterterrorism policies, perceived likelihood of abuse, and relative preferences for both goods. We use the data collected in the 2010 survey to investigate how liberals, moderates, and conservatives differ in their perceptions of each of these factors. We hypothesize that liberals, compared to moderates or conservatives, are more likely to believe that counterterrorism policies are unlikely to be effective and also more likely to believe that these policies would be abused by government. To test these hypotheses, we first examined the percent of each group selecting different response categories. We then estimated logistic regression models where the dependent variable was based on (1) a question that asked respondents to evaluate the effectiveness of each counterterrorism policy and (2) a question concerning how likely it is that the policy would be abused by government officials. For example, Figure 2 contains the questions pertaining to harsh methods for interrogation.

We collapsed responses for each question into dichotomous variables (effective or not effective, likely or unlikely) and estimated the odds of (1) effectiveness and (2) likelihood of abuse as a function of self-described political leaning

(liberal, moderate, or conservative). Each regression included dummy variables for political leaning (with liberals as the omitted reference category). Covariates in both sets of regressions included age, gender, race, education, whether or not the respondent has a household income of over \$35,000, and employment status.

We also estimated the perceived risk of a terrorist attack using data collected from two questions. The first question asked respondents what they thought the likelihood was of a terrorist attack killing at least 3,000 people in the next 10 years. The second question asked respondents to predict the number of expected deaths from terrorism over this same time period. We fitted Generalized Linear Models to determine the association between the expected risk of a terrorist attack and the expected number of deaths from terrorism as a function of political leanings using the same covariates as described above. For expected risk, we specified the Binomial family with a logit link, for the expected number of deaths we specified the Negative Binomial family with a log link. We hypothesized that liberals will predict the least number of deaths from terrorism, followed by moderates and conservatives.

C. Methods for Measuring Differences in Policy Preferences: Results of the DCE

In addition to differences in perceived policy constraints, our theoretical discussion also revealed that policy choices can be driven by differences in preferences over the importance of protecting civil liberties. To measure differences in policy preferences, we analyzed responses to the DCE tasks using a random utility model

(RUM; Hensher, Rose, and Greene 2005). For each policy option j , the total utility (u_j) is determined by the observable component of utility (v_j) and a random error term (ε_j) representing the component of utility which is unobservable:

$$u_j = v_j + \varepsilon_j$$

Assuming participants are rational, respondents will choose the option that gives them the highest expected utility. Given this framework, the probability that option j will be chosen over option k is $\Pr(u_j > u_k) = \Pr(\varepsilon_k - \varepsilon_j < v_j - v_k)$. The random error terms are assumed to be independently and identically distributed extreme value. We use the mixed logit model (Train 2003) to account for possible heterogeneity in preferences:

$$v_{ij} = \beta'_i \mathbf{x}_j + \gamma_{p(i)} t_j + \delta_{p(i)} r_j$$

$$\beta_{ik} \sim N(\beta_{p(i)k}, \sigma_k)$$

The observable component of utility (v_{ij}) of an individual i for policy j is approximated by a linear combination of the civil liberties attributes (\mathbf{x}_j), increase in taxes (t_j) and the risk of a major terrorist attack (r_j) over the next 10 years. The contribution of policy features to v_{ij} is weighted by random individual-specific preference weights (β_i), while the contribution of tax increases and risk of major terrorist attack are weighted by fixed affiliation-specific preference weights ($\gamma_{p(i)}$ and $\delta_{p(i)}$). Each k th element in β_i is independently and identically distributed normal with affiliation-specific mean $\beta_{p(i)k}$ and standard deviation σ_k . Tax and national security outcome attributes were coded as continuous variables whereas the other attributes were effects coded. Effects coding allows for comparisons of relative preferences of attribute levels. The model was estimated over the whole sample, with interaction terms between all attribute levels and political affiliation.

D. Net Welfare Change Calculations

The welfare gain or loss for a given change in a policy is the amount of money (or, in this case, increase in taxes) that would leave a respondent indifferent between a new policy and an existing one. If we assume \mathbf{x}_1 to represent the vector of attribute levels of civil liberties for a new policy while \mathbf{x}_0 to represent the same for an existing policy, then the change in welfare for a given change in attribute levels is the

level of increase in taxes (t^*) which satisfies the following equation:

$$v_{i1} = \beta'_i \mathbf{x}_1 + \gamma_{p(i)} t^* + \delta_{p(i)} r_1 = \beta'_i \mathbf{x}_0 + \delta_{p(i)} r_0 = v_{i0}$$

Hence the welfare change is given as $t^* = \beta'_i (\mathbf{x}_1 - \mathbf{x}_0) / \gamma_{p(i)}$. We estimated the change in welfare for each political group following a shift from their least to most preferred level of a given civil liberty attribute, and also following a shift from a common baseline policy to policies with different levels of restrictions on civil liberties.

Similarly, the maximum acceptable risk of a terrorist attack for a given change in attribute-levels is given as $r^* = \beta'_i (\mathbf{x}_1 - \mathbf{x}_0) / \delta_{p(i)}$. We also estimated the maximum acceptable risk of a terrorist attack that each political group is willing to accept to transition from their most to their least preferred level, and also to transition from a common baseline policy to policies with different levels of restrictions on civil liberties.

III. RESULTS

A. Sample Characteristics

Of 973 individuals who were invited to take this survey, 782 individuals responded; yielding a completion rate of 80%. However, 53 individuals who did not respond to the DCE choice tasks and 78 individuals who failed the consistency test—as discussed below—were excluded from the analysis; leaving the final sample size to 652.

Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for respondents of the survey as compared to the 2010 U.S. Census. Although KN's panel is designed to be representative of the U.S. adult population, unweighted, individual samples are not guaranteed to match the U.S. population. Compared to the 2010 U.S. Census, our sample is 12 years older and differs along several other dimensions, although in many cases the magnitude of the differences is small. In particular, the distribution of political affiliation in the sample is not significantly different from census ($p=0.9407$). Also income differences across political groups were insignificant ($p=0.1424$).

Table 4 reports the percentage of respondents who believe the different countermeasures would be effective, stratified by political affiliation.³ Consistent with our hypotheses, in each case liberals were least likely to believe these strategies would be effective, followed by moderates

3. The effectiveness question was not asked for jailing suspected terrorists without trial.

TABLE 3
Descriptive Statistics

	Survey Sample	Census
Sample size	652	
<i>General demographics^a</i>		
Age (median)	49*	36
Female	47%	51%
Income (above \$35,000) ^b	58%*	66%
College graduate or some college	60%*	55%
<i>Race, ethnicity, nationality^a</i>		
Non-white	23%	26%
U.S. citizen	97%*	93%
<i>Employment status^c</i>		
Employed	57%	58%
Unemployed	9%*	6%
Not in labor force	34%	35%
<i>Political beliefs^d</i>		
Liberal	28%	29%
Moderate	32%	29%
Conservative	40%	43%

^aGeneral demographic and race/ethnicity/nationality data were obtained from the American Community Survey (2011) as national averages for 2005–2009.

^bApproximately 10% of respondents refused to provide information about their income.

^cEmployment status data were obtained from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) (2010) and reflect annual U.S. estimates for 2010.

^dData regarding U.S. political beliefs were obtained from the American National Election Survey (ANES) Guide to Public Opinion and Electoral Behavior (2009) and reflect 2008 estimates.

*Estimates are significantly different from census data estimates at the 5% level.

and then conservatives. All three groups believed that allowing government greater access to personal information would be an effective counterterrorism policy, with effectiveness ranging from 79% for liberals to roughly 87% for moderates and conservatives. Liberals were more suspicious of the effectiveness of racial profiling and harsh methods of interrogation, with only 51% believing these to be effective policies. That figure climbed to over 70% for moderates and over 83% for conservatives.

Although all three groups believed the threat of government abuse of these policies is high, as expected, liberals reported the highest likelihood of abuse, with values ranging from 89% for jailing suspected terrorists without trial to 93% for allowing greater access to personal information. Although percentages were lower, conservatives also recognized the high potential for abuse, with estimates ranging from 68% for jailing without trial to 89% for greater access to personal information. Moderates were generally somewhere in between.

The three groups also differed greatly on the perceived threat of a terrorist attack over the next 10 years. Whereas only 20% of liberals believed there would be a major terrorist attack on U.S. soil over the next 10 years, this figure was 26% for moderates and 34% for conservatives. Liberals also believed the attack was likely to be less severe. They predicted mean deaths from such an attack of 1,100, whereas moderates predicted over 13,000 deaths and conservatives predicted over 42,000. These differences, in addition to differences in perceived effectiveness and likelihood of abuse, were likely to drive differences in preferences for select counterterrorism measures.

Table 5 presents results of the logistic regressions that explore whether or not the differences by political affiliation remain after controlling for other covariates. Differences in perceived effectiveness of greater access to personal information were not significantly different across the three groups after taking differences in sociodemographics into account. Those over age 50, blacks, and the “other” race category were more likely to perceive this measure to be effective. For racial profiling and harsh methods of interrogation, even after controlling for differences in sociodemographics, liberals remained less likely to believe these measures to be effective, followed by moderates and then conservatives, and in each case, the magnitude of the differences was large. Those over age 50 and those from higher income households were more likely to believe racial profiling to be effective. As compared to whites, blacks also were more likely to believe harsh methods of interrogation to be effective. Few other variables were predictive across the different policy options.

Table 6 presents logistic regression results for the likelihood of abuse for each of the four counterterrorism policies. Results were generally consistent with the unadjusted results of Table 4 with liberals much more likely to believe these policies would be abused by government, followed by moderates and then conservatives. Those over age 50 reported a statistically significant lower likelihood of abuse for access to personal information and harsh methods of interrogation. Those from higher income households also reported lower likelihoods of abuse, with differences statistically significant for racial profiling and harsh methods of interrogation. As with the results for effectiveness of these policies, few other variables were predictive.

TABLE 4
Perception of Counterterrorism Policies and Risk of Terrorist Attack by Political Affiliation

Perception of Counterterrorism Policies and Perceived Risk of Terrorist Attack	Political Affiliation		
	Liberals (<i>n</i> = 182)	Moderates (<i>n</i> = 209)	Conservatives (<i>n</i> = 261)
<i>% who believe counterterrorism policy to be effective (SE)</i>			
Access to personal information	79.3% (4.0%)	87.0% (2.7%)	87.8% (2.1%)
Racial profiling	51.8% (4.8%)	70.9% (3.7%)	87.9% (2.2%)
Harsh methods	51.4% (4.8%)	71.3% (3.9%)	82.8% (2.8%)
<i>% who believe policy will likely be abused by the government (SE)</i>			
Access to personal information	93.4% (1.9%)	86.1% (2.8%)	89.1% (2.5%)
Racial profiling	89.0% (2.3%)	81.4% (3.1%)	70.3% (3.6%)
Harsh methods	92.8% (1.9%)	80.1% (3.5%)	71.7% (3.5%)
Jailing	88.7% (3.0%)	73.4% (3.8%)	67.9% (3.5%)
<i>Perceived threat of terrorist attack over the next 10 years</i>			
Mean likelihood of an attack (SE)	20.0% (2.0%)	25.7% (2.1%)	33.8% (2.2%)
Mean deaths in thousands (SE)	1.1 (0.1)	13.1 (9.6)	42.5 (31.7)

TABLE 5
Logit Model of Association between Perceived Effectiveness of Counterterrorism Policies and Political Affiliation after Controlling for Covariates

Variables	Odds Ratio (SE)		
	Access to Personal Information	Racial Profiling	Harsh Methods
Liberal		Reference	
Moderate	1.690 (0.610)	1.889* (0.524)	2.979* (0.854)
Conservative	1.561 (0.518)	6.225* (1.929)	4.903* (1.457)
Age under 50		Reference	
Age over 50	2.036* (0.600)	2.099* (0.647)	1.144 (0.306)
Male		Reference	
Female	1.101 (0.313)	1.307 (0.319)	1.075 (0.253)
Income under \$35,000		Reference	
Income over \$35,000	1.109 (0.357)	1.739* (0.479)	1.296 (0.362)
High school diploma or lower		Reference	
College graduate or some college	0.605 (0.190)	0.309* (0.088)	1.034 (0.267)
White		Reference	
Black	4.341* (2.650)	0.749 (0.291)	2.278* (0.981)
Asian	0.938 (0.646)	0.833 (0.482)	0.629 (0.368)
Other	1.251* (0.779)	0.878 (0.375)	0.696 (0.322)
Employed		Reference	
Unemployed	0.810 (0.416)	1.047 (0.425)	2.098 (1.016)
Not in labor force	1.147 (0.378)	0.788 (0.246)	0.923 (0.271)
Constant	3.772* (1.646)	1.603 (0.584)	0.728 (0.287)

* $p < 0.05$.

TABLE 6

Logit Model of Association between Perceived Likelihood of Abuse of Counterterrorism Policies and Political Affiliation after Controlling for Covariates

Variables	Odds Ratio (SE)			
	Access to Personal Information	Racial Profiling	Harsh Methods	Jailing
Liberal		Reference		
Moderate	0.334* (0.145)	0.612 (0.204)	0.311* (0.119)	0.366* (0.136)
Conservative	0.402 (0.199)	0.298* (0.102)	0.169* (0.062)	0.256* (0.091)
Age under 50		Reference		
Age over 50	0.461* (0.159)	1.084 (0.295)	0.558* (0.155)	0.677 (0.175)
Male		Reference		
Female	0.644 (0.220)	0.763 (0.196)	1.229 (0.335)	1.076 (0.248)
Income under \$35,000		Reference		
Income over \$35,000	0.762 (0.304)	0.476* (0.142)	0.409* (0.129)	0.791 (0.248)
High school diploma or lower		Reference		
College graduate or some college	0.899 (0.327)	1.603 (0.437)	1.010 (0.291)	0.906 (0.243)
White		Reference		
Black	0.471 (0.315)	0.966 (0.501)	1.125 (0.665)	1.247 (0.568)
Asian	1.468 (1.128)	4.111 (2.997)	0.711 (0.645)	16.936* (18.151)
Other	0.179* (0.079)	0.979 (0.471)	0.663 (0.316)	0.746 (0.321)
Employed		Reference		
Unemployed	1.102 (0.765)	0.863 (0.402)	2.348 (1.509)	1.515 (0.732)
Not in labor force	0.999 (0.356)	0.825 (0.258)	1.099 (0.319)	1.204 (0.348)
Constant	55.705* (31.956)	11.067* (4.606)	28.522* (11.981)	9.579* (4.831)

* $p < 0.05$.

Table 7 presents regression adjusted results for the expected number of deaths from terrorism over the next 10 years and the expected risk of a terrorist attack that kills more than 3,000 people. For expected number of deaths from terrorism, the ordering is similar to that reported in Table 4 but smaller in magnitude. This results because other variables that differed across the three groups also influenced this prediction. *Ceteris paribus*, older adults, those with higher income, and the “other” race category also reported higher predictions, whereas females, those with greater levels of education, and blacks reported lower estimates. Results are similar for predictions of expected risk of a terrorist attack, although differences between liberals and moderates were not statistically significant nor were the racial differences or differences in education and income levels.

B. Results on Data Validity

In the choice task where we tested attention, 78 individuals failed to choose the better option. We dropped these respondents from the analysis, as we believe that these respondents were not paying close attention to the attributes and levels or they did not understand the task they were given. The results from the hold-out task analysis show that the predicted uptake for Option A is 60% and it is 40% for Option B; the actual choice of Option A is 59% and it is 41% for Option B. These results indicate that when predicting out-of-sample choices, the RUM model performs well.

C. DCE Results—Measuring Differences in Policy Preferences

Mixed logit results from the DCE data are shown in Table A2 and graphically in Figure 3.

TABLE 7

Generalized Linear Model of Association between Expected Number of Deaths from Terrorism Over the Next 10 Years and Political Affiliation after Controlling for Covariates

Variables	Log of Expected Number of Deaths (SE)	Logit of Expected Risk of a Terrorist Attack (SE)
Liberal	Reference	Reference
Moderate	1.093* (0.362)	0.244 (0.168)
Conservative	1.230* (0.241)	0.690* (0.158)
Age under 50	Reference	Reference
Age over 50	1.107* (0.372)	0.394* (0.145)
Male	Reference	Reference
Female	-0.516* (0.259)	-0.293* (0.131)
Income under \$35,000	Reference	Reference
Income over \$35,000	0.867* (0.303)	0.087 (0.146)
High school diploma or lower	Reference	Reference
College graduate or some college	-0.728* (0.317)	-0.274 (0.139)
White	Reference	Reference
Black	-1.046* (0.333)	-0.136 (0.238)
Asian	0.127 (0.544)	0.666 (0.486)
Other	2.749* (0.767)	-0.151 (0.269)
Employed	Reference	Reference
Unemployed	-0.147 (0.423)	-0.319 (0.223)
Not in labor force	-0.109 (0.375)	-0.139 (0.156)
Constant	6.972* (0.339)	-1.204* (0.196)

* $p < 0.05$.

In Table A2, the first three columns show the estimated mean preference weights for each attribute level, conditional on political affiliation. Reference levels are fixed at zero and attribute levels associated with larger values indicate greater preferences. The last column of Table A2 reports standard deviations of the preferences weights, which were assumed to be uniform across political affiliations. The standard deviations were significant for “always allowing government access to personal information” and for “2 to 7 years of jailing suspected terrorists without trial.” Hence, these variables had the highest taste heterogeneity.

Figure 3 conveys the regression coefficients rescaled, via a positive affine transformation, such that the sum of the coefficients within an attribute is set to 5 (as opposed to 0 due to effects coding) and the scale ranges between 0 and 10. Since utility functions are unique up to a positive affine transformation, the rescaled coefficients represent the same preferences as in Table A2. Figure 3 provides a visual representation of the optimal policy for each political affiliation but also makes clear that there is considerable uncertainty around the estimates.


The figure reveals that all three groups showed a strong aversion for always allowing government access to personal information. Liberals and moderates did not have strong preferences over racial profiling, whereas conservatives were opposed to never allowing profiling. Neither moderates nor conservatives had strong preferences in terms of duration of jailing suspected terrorists without a trial, whereas liberals were against holding them indefinitely.

The most striking difference was that in preferences for the use of harsh methods for interrogation. Liberals and moderates had strong preferences against these methods being always allowed but were indifferent over the levels for the remaining categories. Conservatives, however, were opposed to never allowing harsh methods, but differences across the remaining categories were not statistically significant.

Table 8 presents the maximum risk of a terrorist attack that each political group would willingly accept for a shift from the most restrictive set of policies to less restrictive policies. Liberals were willing to accept an 18% (95% C.I. 12%–24%) and 19% (95% C.I. 12%–25%) greater risk in the next 10 years for a shift from the “most restrictive” to the “less restrictive” and from the “most restrictive” to the “least restrictive” policies, respectively, whereas moderates were willing to accept an 11% (95% C.I. 7%–14%) and 9% (95% C.I. 5%–13%) greater risk for the same shift in policy. Conservatives were willing to accept a 6% (95% C.I. 2%–9%) greater terrorist risk for a shift from the “most restrictive” to the “less restrictive” policy; however, they were not willing to accept any increase in risk for a shift to the “least restrictive” policy. The differences in willingness to accept risk between liberals and conservatives for transition to both sets of policies were statistically significant.

Table 8 also presents the welfare change for each group for a shift from the most restrictive

FIGURE 3
Preferences by Political Affiliation



but lowest risk (0.1%) of terrorist attack scenario to the least restrictive policy with highest risk of terrorist attack (7%). Liberals have a welfare gain of \$1,333 (95% C.I. \$594–\$2,073) in the next 10 years, whereas moderates' welfare gain was not significant. Conservatives, however, because they prefer more restrictive policies, had a welfare loss of \$590 (95% C.I. \$219–\$960). The overall welfare change would be a (nonsignificant) gain of \$175 (95% C.I. –\$96 to \$447) per capita for the society.

IV. DISCUSSION

The September 11th and more recent terror attacks have highlighted the vulnerability of nations to terrorism. To reduce the likelihood of these acts, governments can utilize a variety of policy options. However, an overriding theme of nearly all of these policies is that they come at a cost, both monetarily and in terms of an infringement on civil liberties, privacy, and personal freedoms. Prior to enactment of new homeland

TABLE 8

Average Willingness to Accept Risk of Terrorist Attack Over the Next 10 Years in Order to Transit from the “Most Restrictive” Set of Policies to the “Less Restrictive” and the “Least Restrictive” Policies, Holding Tax Constant

Group	Most Restrictive to Less Restrictive	Most Restrictive to Least Restrictive
Liberal	17.6% [11.6%; 23.6%]*	18.8% [12.1%; 25.4%]*
Moderate	10.6% [7.0%; 14.1%]*	9.1% [5.4%; 12.8%]*
Conservative	5.5% [1.8%; 9.3%]*	-0.2% [-3.9%; 3.6%]

Average Willingness to Pay over the Next 10 Years in Order to Transit from the “Most Restrictive but Least Risky” Set of Policies to the “Least Restrictive but Most Risky” Set of Policies

Group	Most Restrictive to Least Restrictive
Liberal	\$1,333 [\$594; \$2,073]*
Moderate	\$188 [-\$117; \$493]
Conservative	-\$590 [-\$960; -\$219]*

Note: 95% confidence intervals in square brackets.

* $p < 0.05$.

security policies, governments would benefit from a better understanding of the trade-offs the public is willing to make and how these trade-offs vary based on their perceptions of the level of threat, the effectiveness of the policies, and their trust in the government.

This study used a stated-preference DCE method to identify the preferred homeland security policies out of a set of predefined options, while recognizing that the individual impact of a given policy differs based on a variety of factors, including an individual’s political views. Results suggest that self-identified liberals place a higher weight on policies that provide more protection of civil liberties/personal freedoms than self-identified conservatives or moderates. Liberals, for instance, were willing to accept higher terrorist risk to protect civil liberties than moderates and conservatives, and liberals had the strongest preferences, as measured by willingness to pay, for policies that placed the least restrictions on personal freedom and privacy. However, conservatives had stronger preferences for policies that allowed discretion in applying policies that might infringe on privacy and personal freedoms. These differences may reflect the greater trust conservatives have that the government will not abuse their power, rather than that conservatives value the protection of civil liberties less.

It should be noted that although this study is the first to quantify maximum acceptable terrorist risk and welfare changes separately by political affiliation for select homeland security policies, there is a significant political science

literature related to the impact of political ideology on normative preferences. For example, Jenkins-Smith and Herron (2009) showed that preferences for the optimal balance between liberty and security were systematically influenced by political beliefs. As with our findings, liberals preferred the normative balance to be weighted toward liberty over security. However, conservatives preferred an emphasis on security over liberty. Other authors have found similar effects of ideology and partisanship in trade-offs between civil liberties and security (Davis 2007; Davis and Silver 2004); however, none have shown that liberals were willing to accept larger risks for less restrictive policies.

More recent studies show that the public is more likely to support counterterrorism policies at the expense of restricted civil liberties if they perceive a greater threat of terrorism, perceive these policies to be effective at preventing such acts, and have high trust in the government (Garcia and Geva 2014; Van Es 2012). We found a similar pattern in our results: compared to liberals, conservatives perceive the threat of terrorism to be higher, perceive counterterrorism policies to be more effective, and have more trust in the government not to abuse policies. In fact, we find that beliefs about nearly every aspect of homeland security policy, ranging from likelihood of attack to perceived effectiveness to potential for abuse, differed by political affiliation. These differences likely drive the decision to align with a particular political group (i.e., they are endogenous). As such, it is not surprising that once political

affiliation was included in the regression analyses, few other variables were predictive. The finding that blacks did not find racial profiling to be an effective measure is consistent with that reported by Viscusi and Zeckhauser (2003, 2005).

These results should be interpreted in light of several limitations. First, respondents were asked about the likelihood of 3,000 deaths in the next 10 years, which may prime and possibly influence their response to the open-ended question about the expected number of deaths over the next 10 years. This may be why the open-ended questions reported by Viscusi and Zeckhauser (2003, 2005) for the expected number of deaths in the next 12 months generated higher estimates than the ones reported in this paper. Second, although we presented a specific national security outcome for each policy, each respondent has their own opinion about the likelihood of terrorist acts, which influences their support for specific options. It is possible that in answering the questions, respondents relied on their own beliefs, in addition to the specified outcome, when choosing their preferred option. To the extent that respondents recoded the attribute levels to match their own beliefs, the respondents were evaluating different scenarios, which affect the comparisons of willingness to pay across groups. Third, although this study targeted a nationally representative sample, the sample used in our study differed from the averages from the Census data in some dimensions, so the results may not generalize to the population at large. For example, the mean age of the sample data is 12 years older than the U.S. Census data. Age over 50 years is associated with a great likelihood of self-identifying as conservative and was a significant predictor of opinions about the likelihood of abuse and effectiveness of different

policies. Fourth, as with any stated-preference survey, respondents were asked to consider hypothetical policy options with hypothetical tax implications and effectiveness; alternately, if they were asked to vote on specific policies or if they believed their results would be used to set policy, they might provide different responses. In addition, our results are not applicable if the benefits of actual policies differed greatly from the range of estimates presented here.

Fifth, in some cases, differences across political groups were not statistically significant. For many comparisons, statistical significance likely would have been achieved with asking more DCE trade-off questions to each respondent, but we were limited in the number of questions possible given concerns of excess participant burden. DCE questions are not easy to answer and there is an inherent trade-off between breadth and depth when administering participant surveys. We chose to cover several domains in this survey, but recognize this as a limitation for making comparisons across political groups in the DCE section. Finally, public support for a particular counterterrorism policy will fluctuate over time and may vary for reasons beyond those included in the DCE section.

Despite these limitations, this study adds to the growing body of research on the attitudes and opinions of the American public toward homeland security policies. The study demonstrates the potential for stated-preference surveys to provide information on how people trade off the multiple dimensions of policies against each other, which can provide greater understanding of public preferences than surveys that ask about each issue separately.

APPENDIX A: DESCRIPTION OF ATTRIBUTES

TABLE A1
Counterterrorism Policy Options

Strategy	Short Description in Survey
Increasing taxes to fund efforts to prevent terrorism	<p>The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is one of several U.S. government agencies that work to reduce the risk of terrorist attacks on U.S. soil. It has been estimated that the average U.S. taxpayer spends roughly \$200 to fund DHS each year. Of course, the specific amount an individual pays in taxes will depend on his/her income but \$200 per year is an average across all taxpayers. One strategy that a government could take that might lower the threat of a terrorist attack is to increase taxes to fund additional efforts to prevent terrorism.</p> <p>Later in the survey, we will ask you to choose between options that increase <i>your</i> taxes by different amounts to fund government efforts to prevent terrorism. Under each option, the amount your taxes will increase ranges between:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> \$500 over the next 10 years (\$50 per year on average) \$1,500 over the next 10 years (\$150 per year on average) \$3,000 over the next 10 years (\$300 per year on average) \$7,000 over the next 10 years (\$700 per year on average)
Increasing government access to personal information	<p>One strategy that governments could take that might lower the threat of a terrorist attack is to give government agencies more access to individuals' personal information, such as library records, e-mail messages, Web site use, and telephone calls.</p> <p>Later, we will ask you to choose between options that differ in terms of when the U.S. federal government is allowed to see the personal information of its citizens. Under each option, the level of government access to personal information will range between:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Never allowed Allowed but only with a judge's permission Allowed if suspected of terrorist activity but without a judge's permission Always allowed
Using race, ethnicity, or country of citizenship to identify potential terrorists	<p>One strategy that governments could take that might lower the threat of a terrorist attack is to identify potential terrorist suspects for investigation based on a person's race, ethnicity (where their family came from), or their country of citizenship.</p> <p>Later in the survey, we will ask you to choose between options that differ in terms of whether race, ethnic group, or country of citizenship can be used to identify potential terrorist suspects for investigation. Under each option, the use of race, ethnic group, or country of citizenship to identify potential terrorists will be either:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Never allowed Allowed based on country of citizenship only Always allowed
Jailing suspected terrorists without trial	<p>Another strategy that governments could take that might lower the threat of a terrorist attack is to keep suspected terrorists in jail for extended periods of time without a trial.</p> <p>Later, we will ask you to choose between options that differ in terms of how long people may be held <i>without a trial</i>. Under each option, the length of time a suspected terrorist can be jailed without trial will range between:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Less than 6 months 6 months to 2 years 2–7 years Indefinite (no limit)
Using harsh methods to question suspected terrorists	<p>Another strategy that governments could take that might lower the threat of a terrorist attack is to use harsh and painful methods when questioning suspected terrorists to obtain information that might otherwise not be revealed.</p> <p>Later in the survey, we will ask you to choose between options that differ in terms of when harsh and painful methods can be used to question suspected terrorists. Under each option, the circumstances of when harsh and painful methods can be used to question suspected terrorists will range between:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Never allowed in any case Allowed, but only after approval from a responsible official (like a judge) <i>and</i> to prevent a possible imminent attack Allowed, but only after approval from a responsible official (like a judge) regardless of whether an attack is imminent Allowed whenever the questioner thinks it might be effective in gathering information that will help in the fight against terrorism

APPENDIX B: ADDITIONAL TABLES AND FIGURES

TABLE A2
Mixed Logit Coefficient Estimates by Political Affiliation

Variables	Mean (SE)			Standard Deviation (SE)
	Liberal (<i>n</i> = 182)	Moderate (<i>n</i> = 209)	Conservative (<i>n</i> = 261)	
Tax ^a	-0.606* (0.124)	-1.043* (0.134)	-0.789* (0.103)	NA ^b
National security outcome ^a	-0.136* (0.020)	-0.180* (0.021)	-0.132* (0.017)	NA ^b
<i>Government access to personal information</i>				
Never allowed			Reference ^c	
Allowed but only with a judge's permission	0.199* (0.097)	0.211* (0.097)	0.144 (0.078)	0.004 (0.220)
Allowed if suspected of terrorist activity but without a judge's permission	0.066 (0.102)	0.139 (0.095)	0.027 (0.081)	0.222 (0.196)
Always allowed	-0.469* (0.107)	-0.463* (0.101)	-0.222* (0.081)	0.305* (0.138)
<i>Using race, ethnicity, or country of citizenship to identify potential terrorists</i>				
Never allowed			Reference ^c	
Allowed based on country of citizenship only	0.067 (0.076)	-0.044 (0.072)	0.091 (0.061)	0.003 (0.237)
Always allowed	-0.129 (0.077)	-0.051 (0.077)	0.064 (0.062)	0.177 (0.148)
<i>Jailing suspected terrorists without trial</i>				
Less than 6 months			Reference ^c	
6 months to 2 years	0.198* (0.098)	0.129 (0.096)	0.105 (0.080)	0.000 (0.128)
2-7 years	0.024 (0.103)	0.047 (0.100)	-0.022 (0.081)	0.344* (0.131)
Indefinite (no limit)	-0.428* (0.103)	-0.189* (0.093)	-0.121 (0.078)	0.011 (0.187)
<i>Using harsh methods to question suspected terrorists</i>				
Never allowed			Reference ^c	
Allowed, but only with approval from responsible official to prevent imminent attack	0.152 (0.101)	0.062 (0.096)	0.197* (0.079)	0.001 (0.139)
Allowed, but only with approval from responsible official regardless of whether an attack is imminent	0.199* (0.096)	0.347* (0.095)	0.085 (0.077)	0.058 (0.380)
Always allowed	-0.702* (0.117)	-0.558* (0.113)	-0.022 (0.082)	0.220 (0.209)
Log Likelihood				-1531.43

^aCoded as a linear term.

^bNonrandom coefficients.

^cValue of reference category is the negative of the sum of the remaining categories.

* $p < 0.05$; tests whether the coefficient is significantly different than zero.

FIGURE A1
Warm-Up Choice Task



	Option A	Option B
Government Policy Options to Improve Security		
Increase in your taxes to fund efforts to prevent terrorism over the next 10 years	\$500 over the next 10 years (\$50 per year on average)	\$3,000 over the next 10 years (\$300 per year on average)
Government access to personal information	Allowed but only with a judge's permission	Allowed but only with a judge's permission
Using race, ethnicity, or country of citizenship to identify potential terrorists	Not allowed	Not allowed
Jailing suspected terrorists without trial	Less than 6 months	Less than 6 months
Using harsh methods to question suspected terrorists	Allowed, but only with approval from responsible official to prevent imminent attack	Allowed, but only with approval from responsible official to prevent imminent attack
National Security Outcomes		
Chance that 3,000 deaths from terrorism will occur on U.S. soil over the next 10 years.	Chances are 70 out of 1,000 (7%) 	Chances are 10 out of 1,000 (1%) 
	If these were your only two options, which would you choose?	—

FIGURE A2
Choice Task for Consistency Test





	Option A	Option B
Government Policy Options to Improve Security		
Increase in your taxes to fund efforts to prevent terrorism over the next 10 years	\$3,000 over the next 10 years [\$300 per year on average]	\$500 over the next 10 years [\$50 per year on average]
Government access to personal information	Allowed but only with a judge's permission	Allowed but only with a judge's permission
Using race, ethnicity, or country of citizenship to identify potential terrorists	Not allowed	Not allowed
Jailing suspected terrorists without trial	Less than 6 months	Less than 6 months
Using harsh methods to question suspected terrorists	Allowed, but only with approval from responsible official to prevent imminent attack	Allowed, but only with approval from responsible official to prevent imminent attack
National Security Outcomes		
Chance that 3,000 deaths from terrorism will occur on U.S. soil over the next 10 years.	Chances are 70 out of 1,000 [7%] 	Chances are 10 out of 1,000 [1%] 
	If these were your only two options, which would you choose?	—

FIGURE A3
Hold-Out Task for Out-of-Sample Prediction

	Option A	Option B
Government Strategies to Improve Security		
Increase in your taxes to fund efforts to prevent terrorism over the next 10 years	\$7,000 over 10 years or \$700 per year on average	\$1,500 over 10 years or \$150 per year on average
Government access to personal information	Allowed if suspected of terrorist activity but without a judge's permission	Never allowed
Using race, ethnicity, or country of citizenship to identify potential terrorists	Allowed based on country of citizenship only	Never allowed
Jailing suspected terrorists without trial	Less than 6 months	6 months to 2 years
Using harsh methods to question suspected terrorists	Allowed, but only with approval from responsible official to prevent imminent attack	Never allowed
National Security Outcomes		
Chance that 3,000 deaths from terrorism will occur on U.S. soil over the next 10 years.	Chances are 1 out of 1,000 [0.1%] 	Chances are 70 out of 1,000 [7%] 
	If these were your only two options, which would you choose?	—

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